No matter how much we strategize, plan, and protect ourselves from them, accidents are likely to occur. To make mistakes is natural. Though, there are a few incidents that are so profound in scope, that they change the intellectual setting in relation to a particular sector. Accidents at work in Britian and Italy in the 1970s, ultimately led to new safety regulations in the workplace. Yet, some recent incidents, such as the BP Texas City incident, are yet to have a noticeable affect on how associated workplace procedures are carried out. Adjusting and understanding present practice in spite of such tragedies is pivotal to guaranteeing workplace safety.
The Flixborough Disaster
On June 1, 1974, a temporary bypass pipe installed at the Flixborough chemical plant owned by Nypro UK, ruptured. The resulting explosion killed everyone in the control room, nine other people working nearby, one other person by heart attack, and caused damage and injury to buildings and people in a 1.6 km radius around the plant. The explosion, which was measured to be the equivalent of 15 tonnes of TNT, affected just under 2,000 buildings. Though the initial investigation blamed the pipe, a second investigation in 2000 posits that there were actually two explosions, beginning with a smaller one within the system, which led to the build-up of cyclohexane that caused the larger explosion.
The catastrophe, which was reported widely by the BBC and Yorkshire Television, triggered an excessive amount of public concern and anger about safe practices at plants where possibly dangerous chemicals were handled or utilized. The towns-people of Flixborough, who had been opposing the plant's presence for years, led the movement. While against their desires the plant was re-erected, there were big changes made to the guidelines and rules around working with unsafe substances at all UK plants.
The Seveso Disaster
On July 10, 1976, north of Milan in Italy, Building B at a chemical processing plant for Industrie Chimiche Meda Societ Azionaria detonated. The blast spread 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), a chemical used mainly in Agent Orange and herbicides, affecting over 120,000 people over the settlements of Seveso, Cesano Maderno, Barlassina, Meda, Desio, and Bovisio-Masciago. Residents were instructed not to eat fruits or vegetables in the vicinity. More than 3,000 animals died instantly, and then 80,000 were finally killed in order to uphold the stability of the food chain. 15 infants with skin infection, 447 adults with chloracne and skin wounds, and 26 women in pregnancy were hospitalized. The level of contact to the chemical in the expectant women caused all 26 needing terminations. To this day the fallouts have continued and include more occurrences of gastrointestinal, and breast cancers, chloracne, and respiratory.
The dates of these two catastrophes being close to each other, stemmed the making of the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations, a series of regulations that specifically speak to companies or plants that store, or handle, harmful materials in sizeable quantities. The guidelines split chemical plants and storage facilities into two Ranks. Conditional on the quantity of hazardous material there is, there are different rules concerning plant practices, reporting, and chemical disposal.
BP Texas City Refinery
On March 23, 2005, a portion of the Texas City Oil Refinery owned by BP exploded, killing 15 workers and injuring almost 200 more. The explosion was ultimately blamed on multiple maintenance and safety violations. Complaints and issues regarding structural and procedural problems had been raised by employees repeatedly beginning over ten years earlier, but none of them had been addressed. The company was ultimately fined $21 million for the disaster, and an additional $87 million for not addressing the issue in a timely manner, which led to four more accidents at the plant between 2005 and 2010. In general, BP's record for workplace safety is one of the worst in the world.
Although this accident led to scrutiny and recommended amendments to BP's practices in health and safety, it did not lead to comprehensive re-examination of the kind shown in reaction to the Seveso and Flixborough disasters. This is a shame. Learning from accidents of this sort and altering practice to tackle the procedures that cause problems, is the most important role that the occurrences can assume in the fall out of the disasters. It is important to assume change instantly, before memories of the disaster and our willingness to make a judgement, dwindles over time. Though safety boards are continuously trying to assess risk, the best moment to assess whether health and safety procedures need alterations, is once they fail. If close examination and succeeding progress does not take place in response to work place incidents, then we are lost to repeat our regularly fatal mistakes.
The Flixborough Disaster
On June 1, 1974, a temporary bypass pipe installed at the Flixborough chemical plant owned by Nypro UK, ruptured. The resulting explosion killed everyone in the control room, nine other people working nearby, one other person by heart attack, and caused damage and injury to buildings and people in a 1.6 km radius around the plant. The explosion, which was measured to be the equivalent of 15 tonnes of TNT, affected just under 2,000 buildings. Though the initial investigation blamed the pipe, a second investigation in 2000 posits that there were actually two explosions, beginning with a smaller one within the system, which led to the build-up of cyclohexane that caused the larger explosion.
The catastrophe, which was reported widely by the BBC and Yorkshire Television, triggered an excessive amount of public concern and anger about safe practices at plants where possibly dangerous chemicals were handled or utilized. The towns-people of Flixborough, who had been opposing the plant's presence for years, led the movement. While against their desires the plant was re-erected, there were big changes made to the guidelines and rules around working with unsafe substances at all UK plants.
The Seveso Disaster
On July 10, 1976, north of Milan in Italy, Building B at a chemical processing plant for Industrie Chimiche Meda Societ Azionaria detonated. The blast spread 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), a chemical used mainly in Agent Orange and herbicides, affecting over 120,000 people over the settlements of Seveso, Cesano Maderno, Barlassina, Meda, Desio, and Bovisio-Masciago. Residents were instructed not to eat fruits or vegetables in the vicinity. More than 3,000 animals died instantly, and then 80,000 were finally killed in order to uphold the stability of the food chain. 15 infants with skin infection, 447 adults with chloracne and skin wounds, and 26 women in pregnancy were hospitalized. The level of contact to the chemical in the expectant women caused all 26 needing terminations. To this day the fallouts have continued and include more occurrences of gastrointestinal, and breast cancers, chloracne, and respiratory.
The dates of these two catastrophes being close to each other, stemmed the making of the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations, a series of regulations that specifically speak to companies or plants that store, or handle, harmful materials in sizeable quantities. The guidelines split chemical plants and storage facilities into two Ranks. Conditional on the quantity of hazardous material there is, there are different rules concerning plant practices, reporting, and chemical disposal.
BP Texas City Refinery
On March 23, 2005, a portion of the Texas City Oil Refinery owned by BP exploded, killing 15 workers and injuring almost 200 more. The explosion was ultimately blamed on multiple maintenance and safety violations. Complaints and issues regarding structural and procedural problems had been raised by employees repeatedly beginning over ten years earlier, but none of them had been addressed. The company was ultimately fined $21 million for the disaster, and an additional $87 million for not addressing the issue in a timely manner, which led to four more accidents at the plant between 2005 and 2010. In general, BP's record for workplace safety is one of the worst in the world.
Although this accident led to scrutiny and recommended amendments to BP's practices in health and safety, it did not lead to comprehensive re-examination of the kind shown in reaction to the Seveso and Flixborough disasters. This is a shame. Learning from accidents of this sort and altering practice to tackle the procedures that cause problems, is the most important role that the occurrences can assume in the fall out of the disasters. It is important to assume change instantly, before memories of the disaster and our willingness to make a judgement, dwindles over time. Though safety boards are continuously trying to assess risk, the best moment to assess whether health and safety procedures need alterations, is once they fail. If close examination and succeeding progress does not take place in response to work place incidents, then we are lost to repeat our regularly fatal mistakes.
About the Author:
To help prevent your company from commiting any health & safety offences, visit our online health & safety training site for a free access trial of our courses.
0 comments:
Post a Comment